diff --git a/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity.go b/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity.go
index ce80acc1..de246b30 100644
--- a/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity.go
+++ b/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity.go
@@ -906,9 +906,22 @@ func guardLastActiveAdminTx(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, principalID string,
 	return nil
 }
 
+// auditKeyValueExempt reports whether a (key, value) pair should bypass the
+// sensitive-key heuristic based on its value. issued_token is a boolean flag
+// written by the bootstrap completion audit (see cloudBootstrapCompletionMetadata);
+// it is exempt ONLY when the value is actually a bool, so the exemption cannot
+// be used to smuggle a secret string under a trusted key name.
+func auditKeyValueExempt(key string, value any) bool {
+	if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(key), "issued_token") {
+		_, ok := value.(bool)
+		return ok
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 func rejectSensitiveAuthAuditMetadata(metadata map[string]any) error {
 	for key, value := range metadata {
-		if sensitiveAuthAuditKey(key) {
+		if !auditKeyValueExempt(key, value) && sensitiveAuthAuditKey(key) {
 			return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrSensitiveAuditMetadata, key)
 		}
 		if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditValue(value); err != nil {
@@ -936,10 +949,11 @@ func rejectSensitiveAuthAuditValue(value any) error {
 		}
 		for _, key := range reflected.MapKeys() {
 			keyText := key.String()
-			if sensitiveAuthAuditKey(keyText) {
+			entryValue := reflected.MapIndex(key).Interface()
+			if !auditKeyValueExempt(keyText, entryValue) && sensitiveAuthAuditKey(keyText) {
 				return fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrSensitiveAuditMetadata, keyText)
 			}
-			if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditValue(reflected.MapIndex(key).Interface()); err != nil {
+			if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditValue(entryValue); err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
 		}
@@ -955,6 +969,10 @@ func rejectSensitiveAuthAuditValue(value any) error {
 
 func sensitiveAuthAuditKey(key string) bool {
 	key = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(key))
+	// token_prefix is the short, non-secret token prefix; it matches the
+	// fragment heuristic below but never carries secret material. issued_token
+	// is handled by auditKeyValueExempt instead, because it is only safe when
+	// its value is the boolean flag the bootstrap completion audit records.
 	if key == "token_prefix" {
 		return false
 	}
diff --git a/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity_storage_test.go b/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity_storage_test.go
index 3e45a535..79359416 100644
--- a/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity_storage_test.go
+++ b/internal/cloud/cloudstore/identity_storage_test.go
@@ -536,6 +536,31 @@ func TestCloudstoreIdentityPureHelpers(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditMetadata(map[string]any{"events": []map[string]any{{"raw_token": "secret"}}}); !errors.Is(err, ErrSensitiveAuditMetadata) {
 		t.Fatalf("typed nested slice sensitive audit metadata must be rejected, got %v", err)
 	}
+	// Regression: the bootstrap completion audit metadata (created by
+	// cloudBootstrapCompletionMetadata) carries the boolean flag "issued_token".
+	// It is not a secret and must be accepted, otherwise
+	// `engram cloud bootstrap admin --issue-token` fails atomically and no admin
+	// token is ever minted.
+	if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditMetadata(map[string]any{"issued_token": true, "username": "admin", "created_admin": true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("bootstrap completion metadata must be accepted, got %v", err)
+	}
+	// issued_token is false for grant-only bootstraps (no --issue-token); both
+	// boolean values must be accepted.
+	if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditMetadata(map[string]any{"issued_token": false}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("false issued_token must be accepted, got %v", err)
+	}
+	// issued_token is exempt ONLY as a boolean flag. A non-boolean value (e.g. a
+	// string that could carry secret material) must NOT bypass the filter, at
+	// the top level or nested.
+	if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditMetadata(map[string]any{"issued_token": "egc_live_would_be_leaked"}); !errors.Is(err, ErrSensitiveAuditMetadata) {
+		t.Fatalf("non-boolean issued_token must be rejected, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditMetadata(map[string]any{"outer": map[string]any{"issued_token": "egc_live_would_be_leaked"}}); !errors.Is(err, ErrSensitiveAuditMetadata) {
+		t.Fatalf("nested non-boolean issued_token must be rejected, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := rejectSensitiveAuthAuditMetadata(map[string]any{"outer": map[string]any{"issued_token": true}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("nested boolean issued_token must be accepted, got %v", err)
+	}
 }
 
 func tableExists(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, table string) bool {