diff --git a/docs/input-validation-audit.md b/docs/input-validation-audit.md
index bec41a81..46fa12f5 100644
--- a/docs/input-validation-audit.md
+++ b/docs/input-validation-audit.md
@@ -29,8 +29,7 @@ Azure/Sentinel integrations, subprocesses, or external AI providers.
 | Sentinel ingestion CLI | JSON file, scan ID, finding records and environment configuration | Existing regular `.json` file under 10 MiB; at most 1,000 object findings; bounded fields; severity/config format checks |
 | Azure resource data | Management-plane SDK objects | Typed SDK accessors; failures preserved as unknown; no subprocess interpolation |
 | Playbook selection | Rule ID derived from stored finding | Allowlisted identifier converted to a filename and constrained beneath `playbooks/cli` |
-| Website media URLs | User-entered video URL | HTTPS host allowlist and embed conversion tests in `website/test_toEmbedUrl.mjs` |
-| Website editor text | Titles, excerpts, names and Markdown content | Intentionally free-form client-side content; repository write still requires the operator's GitHub token and GitHub authorization |
+| Website content | Titles, excerpts, names and Markdown content authored in Decap CMS | No browser-side renderer remains: content is committed to the repository and rendered by Astro at build time, so nothing user-entered reaches a live DOM sink. Repository writes still require GitHub authorization, and the deployed pages are served under `script-src 'self'` with no inline script |
 
 ## Intentionally unrestricted text
 
diff --git a/website/README.md b/website/README.md
index 20aeb129..85b488a8 100644
--- a/website/README.md
+++ b/website/README.md
@@ -49,8 +49,13 @@ to GitHub Pages, so the official OWASP site reflects release-controlled source.
 Manual runs can deploy only when dispatched from `main`.
 
 GitHub Pages does not support custom response headers. The document-level
-content security policy covers supported directives, but hosting-level headers
-such as `frame-ancestors` require a configurable hosting edge.
+content security policy in `src/layouts/Base.astro` covers only the directives
+a `<meta http-equiv>` policy actually enforces. `frame-ancestors` (and
+`report-uri`/`report-to`, `sandbox`) are ignored in a meta policy, so
+clickjacking protection is **not** in place: it needs a real
+`Content-Security-Policy` or `X-Frame-Options` HTTP response header from a
+configurable hosting edge. `scripts/verify-site.mjs` deliberately does not
+assert `frame-ancestors` so CI never reports protection that does not exist.
 
 ## One-time maintainer setup
 
diff --git a/website/astro.config.mjs b/website/astro.config.mjs
index 545f8231..d58c401a 100644
--- a/website/astro.config.mjs
+++ b/website/astro.config.mjs
@@ -6,7 +6,23 @@ export default defineConfig({
   site: 'https://owasp.github.io',
   base: '/openshield',
   integrations: [sitemap()],
+  build: {
+    // Never inline bundled CSS into the HTML. The site's CSP
+    // (src/layouts/Base.astro) is script-src 'self' with no 'unsafe-inline'
+    // and no nonce/hash - an inlined <script> block would be silently blocked
+    // by the browser on the deployed GitHub Pages site. Emitting every script
+    // as a same-origin file keeps it inside 'self'. verify-site.mjs also fails
+    // the build if an executable inline <script> slips into any page.
+    inlineStylesheets: 'never',
+  },
   vite: {
+    build: {
+      // The setting that actually stops inlining: keep Vite from emitting
+      // small chunks as data: URIs or inline script text during Astro's
+      // client bundle step. Astro's own build schema has no
+      // assetsInlineLimit key, so this is the only place it takes effect.
+      assetsInlineLimit: 0,
+    },
     server: {
       fs: {
         // repoData.ts reads scanner/rules, playbooks and docs from the repo root
diff --git a/website/scripts/verify-site.mjs b/website/scripts/verify-site.mjs
index 61a61cdb..d1e16af0 100644
--- a/website/scripts/verify-site.mjs
+++ b/website/scripts/verify-site.mjs
@@ -39,6 +39,59 @@ for (const file of htmlFiles) {
   if (!html.includes('href="#main-content"')) failures.push(`${relative} has no skip link`);
   if (!html.includes('<meta name="description"')) failures.push(`${relative} has no meta description`);
   if (!html.includes('<link rel="canonical"')) failures.push(`${relative} has no canonical URL`);
+  const csp = html.match(/<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="([^"]+)"/i)?.[1] || '';
+  if (!csp) failures.push(`${relative} has no Content-Security-Policy meta policy`);
+  const scriptPolicy = csp.split(';').find((directive) => directive.trim().toLowerCase().startsWith('script-src')) || '';
+  // This site deliberately permits scripts from its own origin only. Checking
+  // merely for the absence of unsafe-inline would allow a future remote source
+  // to weaken the CSP without failing the production-build verification.
+  if (scriptPolicy.trim() !== "script-src 'self'") {
+    failures.push(`${relative} must use exactly script-src 'self' in its Content-Security-Policy`);
+  }
+  // script-src 'self' with no 'unsafe-inline'/nonce/hash means the browser
+  // silently blocks any inline script on the deployed site. Checking the CSP
+  // string alone would pass while the page is actually broken, so assert the
+  // built HTML carries no executable inline script - every script must be an
+  // external same-origin file (data blocks like application/json and
+  // application/ld+json are not executed and are fine). Astro is configured
+  // (vite.build.assetsInlineLimit: 0) to emit hoisted scripts as files for
+  // exactly this reason. Scanned by hand rather than a tag regex so this is not a
+  // brittle HTML filter (CodeQL js/bad-tag-filter): a case-insensitive index
+  // walk from each opening tag to its closing tag.
+  const lower = html.toLowerCase();
+  for (let open = lower.indexOf('<script'); open !== -1; open = lower.indexOf('<script', open + 7)) {
+    const tagEnd = html.indexOf('>', open);
+    if (tagEnd === -1) break;
+    const attrs = html.slice(open + 7, tagEnd);
+    const close = lower.indexOf('</script', tagEnd);
+    const body = close === -1 ? '' : html.slice(tagEnd + 1, close).trim();
+    const srcMatch = /\bsrc\s*=\s*["']?([^"'\s>]+)/i.exec(attrs);
+    if (srcMatch) {
+      // An external script is only loadable under script-src 'self'; a remote
+      // src would build green and then be CSP-blocked in the browser, which is
+      // the same broken-but-verified class this scan exists to prevent.
+      if (!srcMatch[1].startsWith('/openshield/')) {
+        failures.push(`${relative} loads script ${srcMatch[1]}, which script-src 'self' will block on the deployed site`);
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    const typeMatch = /\btype\s*=\s*["']?([^"'\s>]+)/i.exec(attrs);
+    const type = typeMatch ? typeMatch[1].toLowerCase() : '';
+    if (type === 'application/json' || type === 'application/ld+json' || type === 'speculationrules') continue;
+    if (body) {
+      failures.push(`${relative} has an inline script element that script-src 'self' will block on the deployed site`);
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  // Only directives a <meta http-equiv> CSP actually enforces. frame-ancestors
+  // is deliberately absent: browsers ignore it in a meta policy, and GitHub
+  // Pages cannot set the HTTP response header that would make it effective, so
+  // asserting its presence here would report clickjacking protection that does
+  // not exist. That protection has to come from a real edge/header if the site
+  // ever moves to configurable hosting.
+  for (const directive of ['object-src \'none\'', 'base-uri \'self\'', 'form-action \'self\'']) {
+    if (!csp.includes(directive)) failures.push(`${relative} is missing CSP directive ${directive}`);
+  }
   for (const match of html.matchAll(/href="([^"]+)"/g)) {
     const href = match[1];
     if (!href.startsWith('/openshield/')) continue;
diff --git a/website/src/layouts/Base.astro b/website/src/layouts/Base.astro
index ff9f1f60..ae143ad6 100644
--- a/website/src/layouts/Base.astro
+++ b/website/src/layouts/Base.astro
@@ -98,11 +98,16 @@ const siteJsonLd = {
 {breadcrumbs && <script type="application/ld+json" set:html={JSON.stringify(breadcrumbs)} is:inline></script>}
 
 <!--
-  GitHub Pages cannot configure response headers. This meta policy covers the
-  directives browsers support in document metadata. Hosting-level directives
-  must be added if the deployment moves to a configurable edge.
+  GitHub Pages cannot configure response headers, so this policy ships in a
+  <meta http-equiv> tag. Per the CSP spec, a meta policy enforces only the
+  directives below; frame-ancestors, report-uri/report-to, and sandbox are
+  ignored when delivered this way. Clickjacking protection therefore requires
+  a real Content-Security-Policy (or X-Frame-Options) HTTP response header and
+  must be added at the edge if this site ever moves to configurable hosting;
+  a frame-ancestors directive here would only give a false sense of coverage
+  (verify-site.mjs intentionally does not check for it).
 -->
-<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content={`default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https://api.github.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'`}>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content={`default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https://api.github.com; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'`}>
 <meta name="referrer" content="strict-origin-when-cross-origin">
 </head>
 <body>