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Race condition attack #27

@intech

Description

@intech

There is such a problem as the race condition attack.

This problem is famous when using the ORM pattern as Active Record and Data Mapper.
We get a record for changes and change it outside the transaction, which means that we can execute precisely the same query in parallel.

database/src/methods.js

Lines 592 to 595 in 3729bf9

const entity = await this.resolveEntities(ctx, params, {
transform: false,
throwIfNotExist: true
});

result = await adapter.updateById(id, params, { raw: rawUpdate });

Consider a simple attack in transferring $5 from Alice to Bob:

Get balance Alice -> $5 -> transfer to Bob -$5 -> get balance Bob -> $0 -> received from Alice +$5

And now, if two queries were running at the same time:

Query 1: Get balance Alice -> $5 (race condition!) -> transfer to Bob -$5 -> get balance Bob -> $0 -> received from Alice +$5

Query 2: Get balance Alice -> $5 (race condition!) -> transfer to Bob -$5 -> get balance Bob -> $5 -> recieved from Alice +$5

Bob has a balance of $10, and Alice has $5.

It is elementary to check this behaviour by calling the Promise.all() method, we generate ten requests and, depending on the network, and the processing speed of the database, from 2 to 10 requests will pass simultaneously.

In SQL, the first statement must be with SELECT FOR UPDATE to block against concurrent updates, or both wrapped in a SERIALIZABLE transaction isolation level.

How can we protect ourselves now?

We must wrap the updateEntity method in a transaction with isolation level SERIALIZABLE.
Or use moleculer-channels to update items in strong FIFO in Kafka.

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