Windows: revocation check blocks up to 10s with no effect on verification outcome

[lpapp]

Summary

On Windows, CertGetCertificateChain is called with CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT, which triggers a network call to OCSP/CRL endpoints with a 10-second timeout. However, in verify_chain_policy, CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_REV_UNKNOWN_FLAGS is set, meaning revocation failures are silently ignored in the final policy decision.

This results in a blocking network call of up to 10 seconds that has no effect on whether the certificate is ultimately accepted or rejected.

Impact

In network-restricted environments (e.g., hosts with limited outbound access where OCSP/CRL endpoints are unreachable), the TLS handshake blocks for the full 10-second dwUrlRetrievalTimeout on every first connection attempt. This is particularly problematic f
or:

• Short-lived instances where the CRL cache is always cold
• Hosts behind firewalls that allow :443 to the application server but not to arbitrary OCSP responders
• Applications with request timeouts shorter than 10 seconds (the revocation timeout exceeds the application timeout, causing connection failures)

One can hit this e.g. after migrating from webpki-roots (no network calls) to rustls-platform-verifier (via reqwest 0.13).

Relevant code

In src/verification/windows.rs:

// Chain building — triggers network call
const FLAGS: u32 = CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT
    | CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT
    | CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_END_CERT;

parameters.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout = 10 * 1000; // 10 seconds

// Policy verification — ignores revocation failures
params.dwFlags = CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_REV_UNKNOWN_FLAGS;

Comparison with other implementations

• Go crypto/x509 (root_windows.go): Calls CertGetCertificateChain without any CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_* flags - no revocation network calls.
• The test configuration in this crate: Uses CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL to prevent network calls, which confirms the production code intentionally makes them.

Suggestion

Would you consider one of the following?

1. Remove CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT from the flags, since the result is discarded by the policy step anyway. This eliminates the network call with no change in security posture.

2. Make revocation checking configurable via a builder option on Verifier (e.g., with_revocation_check(bool) or with_revocation_check(RevocationPolicy)) so consumers can opt out in environments where the network call is problematic.

3. Use CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY by default (check cached CRLs without making network calls), with an opt-in for full network-based revocation.

Environment

• Windows Server 2025
• rustls-platform-verifier 0.7.x
• reqwest 0.13