fix(deps): update module github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 to v3 [security] (alauda-v0.43.0) - autoclosed - #59
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ℹ Artifact update noticeFile name: go.modIn order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the
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January 15, 2026 06:50
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This PR contains the following updates:
v2.6.1->v3.0.0Warning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-22703
Impact
A Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event.
This vulnerability only affects users that provide a trusted root via
--trusted-rootor when fetched automatically from a TUF repository, when no trusted key material is provided viaSIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY. When using the default flag values in Cosign v3 to sign and verify (--use-signing-config=trueand--new-bundle-format=truefor signing,--new-bundle-format=truefor verification), users are unaffected. Cosign v2 users are affected using the default flag values.This issue had previously been fixed in GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 but recent refactoring caused a regression. We have added testing to prevent a future regression.
Steps to Reproduce
Patches
Upgrade to Cosign v2.6.2 or Cosign v3.0.4. This does not affect Cosign v1.
Workarounds
You can provide trusted key material via a set of flags under certain conditions. The simplest fix is to upgrade to the latest Cosign v2 or v3 release.
Note that the example below works for
cosign verify,cosign verify-blob,cosign verify-blob-attestation, andcosign verify-attestation`.Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions in github.com/sigstore/cosign
BIT-cosign-2026-22703 / CVE-2026-22703 / GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m / GO-2026-4309
More information
Details
Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions in github.com/sigstore/cosign
Severity
Unknown
References
This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions
BIT-cosign-2026-22703 / CVE-2026-22703 / GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m / GO-2026-4309
More information
Details
Impact
A Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event.
This vulnerability only affects users that provide a trusted root via
--trusted-rootor when fetched automatically from a TUF repository, when no trusted key material is provided viaSIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY. When using the default flag values in Cosign v3 to sign and verify (--use-signing-config=trueand--new-bundle-format=truefor signing,--new-bundle-format=truefor verification), users are unaffected. Cosign v2 users are affected using the default flag values.This issue had previously been fixed in GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 but recent refactoring caused a regression. We have added testing to prevent a future regression.
Steps to Reproduce
Patches
Upgrade to Cosign v2.6.2 or Cosign v3.0.4. This does not affect Cosign v1.
Workarounds
You can provide trusted key material via a set of flags under certain conditions. The simplest fix is to upgrade to the latest Cosign v2 or v3 release.
Note that the example below works for
cosign verify,cosign verify-blob,cosign verify-blob-attestation, andcosign verify-attestation`.Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NReferences
This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
Release Notes
sigstore/cosign (github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2)
v3.0.0Compare Source
Announcing the next major release of Cosign!
Cosign v3 is a minor change from Cosign v2.6.x, with all of the new capabilities of recent
releases on by default, but will still allow you to disable them if you need the older functionality.
These new features include support for the standardized bundle format (
--new-bundle-fomat), providing rootsof trust for verification and service URLs for signing via one file (
--trusted-root,--signing-config),and container signatures stored as an OCI Image 1.1 referring artifact.
Learn more on our v3 announcement blog post! See
the changelogs for v2.6.0, v2.5.0, and v2.4.0 for more information on recent
changes.
If you have any feedback, please reach out on Slack or file an issue on GitHub.
Changes
Configuration
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🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.