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Free, open-source, transparent security suite for Windows, in the spirit of Objective-See: persistence scanner + real-time persistence alerts (Guardian), per-app outbound firewall (WFP), camera/mic & connection visibility, catalog-aware Authenticode. Local-only, no telemetry.

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WinSight, Windows security visibility

WinSight

See and control what is actually happening on your Windows machine.
Free, open source, no telemetry, no account, no paywall.

winsight.edeveloppe.com

CI License: GPL v3 OpenSSF Best Practices Qualification scope: Windows 11 x64 .NET 10 LTS Production readiness not established

WinSight is a suite of small, single-purpose, auditable security tools under one roof - in the spirit of Objective-See for macOS, for Windows.

It shows you what persists across reboots, what watches your camera and microphone, what phones home, and what could be hijacked - and it lets you block any application's outbound traffic at the kernel filtering layer.

Nothing acts on its own. Every check observes and reports. The few things that change the machine happen only when you choose them, are revalidated first, use a bounded action journal (winsight actions): blocking a startup item from a Guardian alert (restorable with winsight restore), allowing one (revocable with winsight revoke), and suspending, resuming or terminating a process (--confirm required). A suspended process can be resumed; terminating a process is irreversible. Beyond those, one feature writes to disk, and says so here:

  • Ransomware protection creates its decoy files. It stays off until you turn it on. Cleanup removes only files whose recorded identity and original content still match; modified, replaced or unverifiable legacy files are preserved. The decoys are ordinary visible files in Documents, Desktop, Pictures, Downloads, Videos and Music - they are not hidden, because a good many ransomware families skip hidden files and a decoy that is skipped is not a decoy.

The hijack scan no longer writes anything. It used to create and delete a probe file in every directory it graded; it now asks Windows (AccessCheck) whether the current user, without elevation, could create a file or folder there. Run as SYSTEM or with UAC disabled, where no non-elevated token exists, it reads the directory ACL for the well-known unprivileged groups instead and says so in the report.

The firewall blocks only what you tell it to.


What it does

Tool Objective-See equivalent What it tells you
Persistence scanner KnockKnock 27 autostart surfaces, catalog-aware Authenticode verdicts, command-line triage for signed interpreters handed someone else's payload, optional VirusTotal enrichment
Outbound firewall LuLu Per-application block/allow enforced through the Windows Filtering Platform; audit-only until you arm it
Guardian BlockBlock A decision window the moment a new startup item appears - Allow, Block (quarantined, restorable) or decide later - plus reconciliation of what changed while WinSight was not running
Ransomware detection RansomWhere? Visible machine-varied decoys, rename/delete bursts, entropy-on-write, and bounded container-signature integrity checks
Camera & mic monitor OverSight ConsentStore activation history/transitions with per-store read coverage and best-effort application/process matching
Connections & DNS Netiquette, DNSMonitor TCP/UDP connection-table snapshots plus live DNS queries, attributed to processes where Windows exposes an owner
Signature verification What's Your Sign? Authenticode, catalog and verified MSIX package verdicts, used by every tool - and for any file from File Explorer's "Check signature with WinSight" (an out-of-process window: verdict, signer, trust caveats, MD5/SHA-1/SHA-256) or winsight sign
Hijack scan DHS Unquoted service paths, writable service directories and PATH entries, and phantom DLL imports - each graded by whether it is exploitable on this machine

Beyond the macOS originals: write attribution names the program behind a persistence or ransomware alert when running elevated (written by setup.exe (pid 4242)) and says why it cannot when it is not, rather than staying silent. Per-process drill-down (winsight process <pid>) and physical-access evidence (winsight presence) are Windows counterparts to TaskExplorer and DoNotDisturb, with narrower live UI and physical-access coverage respectively. And because WinSight's decoys detect ransomware but cannot block it without a driver, the overview also reports its configured and observed operational posture - read-only, including explicit unavailability when Defender cannot be queried. It points to the Windows control; WinSight never changes that setting itself and does not guarantee enforcement of an individual write.

Full detection inventory: docs/DETECTIONS.md. Tool-by-tool comparison: docs/OBJECTIVE_SEE_PARITY.md.

Three ways to use it

  • Dashboard - a WPF desktop and tray application, in English, French and Spanish. Every check explains what it observes and what an alert means.

  • Command line - 28 verbs, with --flagged and --json. Exits non-zero when anything is notable, so it drops straight into a scheduled task. --json emits a versioned envelope - { "schemaVersion": 1, "generatedAt": ..., "reports": [...] } - so a stored report says when it was true and a consumer can tell which contract produced it:

    winsight [persistence|av|net|dns|all]   run checks (default: all)
    winsight firewall | processes | modules | extensions | certs | hosts
    winsight input | integrity | drivers | hijack
    winsight process <pid>                  one process: lineage, modules, connections
    winsight sign <path>                    one file: Authenticode standing + identification hashes
    winsight holders <path>                 which processes hold this file open
    winsight alerts                         alert journal: Guardian, ransomware, camera/mic
    winsight actions                        response-action history (read-only), newest first
    winsight [suspend|resume|terminate] <pid>  act on a process (needs --confirm)
    winsight rules                          allow rules in force (read-only)
    winsight [restore|revoke] <id>          undo a block or an allow (needs --confirm)
    winsight presence                       when this machine woke, and whether anyone was there
    winsight av --watch | dns --watch | attribution --watch | input --watch
    

    The response commands - the process actions and the two undo verbs - do nothing without --confirm, and use a bounded action journal readable with winsight actions. Undo can annotate a retained action; rotation removes older entries. Unavailable or incomplete reads are reported. This is not a permanent audit archive. Three maintenance verbs that setup and uninstall run also change the current user's state without --confirm: register-signature-verb and unregister-signature-verb add and remove the File Explorer entry, and remove-decoys deletes ransomware decoys whose content is still unchanged. A process action revalidates that the target is still the same process and refuses protected and WinSight processes; a restore refuses if something else now occupies the item's original location.

    --unsigned and --nonmicrosoft narrow any scan to unsigned/untrusted items, or to items not proven to carry Microsoft's own signature (an exact Microsoft signing identity on a chain the machine trusts, not a signer name that merely reads "Microsoft"); they stack with each other and with --flagged.

  • MCP server - winsight mcp, local stdio only, read-only, for MCP-compatible AI clients. Six tools, three resources and two guided prompts; no network listener. See docs/MCP.md.

All three share one orchestration layer; detection logic is never duplicated in UI or protocol code.

Install

Download the installer for your machine from the latest release:

Machine File
Intel / AMD 64-bit winsight-vX.Y.Z-win-x64-setup.exe
Windows on Arm winsight-vX.Y.Z-win-arm64-setup.exe

The default install is per-user and needs no administrator rights and no .NET runtime. Portable ZIPs are published for both architectures.

The primary qualification scope is Windows 11 x64, within Microsoft's supported .NET 10 OS lifecycle. The API target windows10.0.19041.0 is a build contract, not Windows 10 qualification. Windows 10 compatibility and privileged Arm64 runtime remain unqualified; see the dated support and validation matrix.

Two consequences of that default, stated here rather than left to be discovered:

  • The outbound firewall is unavailable. A per-user install lands under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs, which the user can write, and the service deliberately refuses to register from any path an unprivileged principal can modify. Install for all users (elevated) if you want the firewall.
  • WinSight's own binaries are replaceable by the adversary in its threat model. Anything running as that user can overwrite them. An all-users install puts them somewhere it cannot.

Verify what you downloaded before running it - checksums, SBOM and GitHub build provenance:

Get-FileHash winsight-vX.Y.Z-win-x64.zip -Algorithm SHA256
gh attestation verify winsight-vX.Y.Z-win-x64.zip --repo ClementG91/winsight

Released binaries are not Authenticode-signed - the project holds no code-signing certificate and currently uses an explicit unsigned-release policy, so Windows will warn on first run. Verify SHA-256 and GitHub attestations before execution. See docs/RELEASE.md.

The outbound firewall service is deliberately not installed by setup: it registers a LocalSystem service and mutates WFP, which should be an explicit decision. See docs/ADMINISTRATION.md.

Security posture

  • No telemetry, no analytics, no account. The only outbound connection is an explicit, user-initiated VirusTotal hash lookup - a hash, never file contents. It is enabled by the presence of a WINSIGHT_VT_KEY environment variable, so a shell or a scheduled task that inherits one makes an otherwise local scan reach the network; pass --no-network to refuse regardless.
  • The privileged boundary is an authenticated named-pipe channel, not the UI. The dashboard is an unprivileged IPC client and cannot change policy on its own; an unelevated administrator is refused exactly like a standard user.
  • Enforcement is opt-in and starts audit-only. Nothing is filtered until an elevated operator arms it, and there is no command-line path to arming - that is the security property, not a missing feature.
  • Desired intent and effective state are reported separately, and never conflated. WinSight distinguishes the desired mode you persisted from the effective runtime state it can actually prove against the live filtering engine. If it cannot verify enforcement exactly, it reports Degraded rather than claiming Active - a security tool that overstates its own protection is worse than one that admits a gap.
  • Unknown outbound applications cannot permanently poison the pending view by arriving first. The service keeps a bounded 128-app least-recently-used window, admits later arrivals, and reports evicted identities and their aggregated observations as incomplete coverage. Capacity-pressure logging is exponentially sampled so a distinct-path flood cannot create unbounded event-log spam.
  • Enforcement survives reboots through service boot persistence, and the state is re-verified on every status read rather than assumed from what was persisted.
  • The service refuses to install from any path an unprivileged principal can write, and re-checks the file's 128-bit NTFS identity before use so it cannot be swapped in between.
  • No kernel driver. Driver-backed interception is deferred rather than half-built, because a production driver needs signing and a separate safety programme.

Threat model, trust boundaries and what is explicitly out of scope: docs/THREAT_MODEL.md. Reporting a vulnerability: SECURITY.md. What leaves your machine, in full: PRIVACY.md.

Code signing

Releases are not Authenticode-signed, so Windows shows an unknown-publisher warning on first run - that warning is accurate. SignPath Foundation declined the free-program application on 2026-07-29 because the project does not yet have enough public adoption signals. The current release policy is therefore explicitly unsigned, not silently downgraded.

Every release carries SHA-256 checksums plus GitHub build provenance and SBOM attestations, which bind the bytes to this repository's release workflow at a named commit. They do not provide a Windows publisher identity; verify them before running anything.

Both attestations cover both artifacts - the portable .zip and the -setup.exe. The SBOM is generated from the package directory that Inno Setup is then handed as its source, so it is the same component inventory either way. Releases published before this covered the .zip alone.

Who may authorise a signature, what one would and would not prove, and how to check a release yourself: docs/CODE_SIGNING.md.

Production readiness

Target Status
Windows 11 x64 Published v0.14.2 passed 32 distinct VM gates on 2026-09-28, including the two-VM network gate, with the authenticated launcher and protected verifier. Current revocation, journal and VirusTotal corrections need qualification on their own bytes. Disk-full/UI recovery, load/endurance and adverse/session trials remain open. See the current matrix and published-byte record. Distribution remains unsigned.
Arm64 (native) Build, tests, packaging and installer are delegated to native Arm64 CI; privileged runtime remains a VM gate; product readiness not established

CodeQL runs through GitHub's default setup, not a workflow in this repository. The run IDs above are real, but nothing under .github/workflows/ configures the analysis, so it cannot be audited from a clone and does not run on forks.

The privileged behaviour CI cannot reach has historical evidence from clean x64 VMs; the local v0.14.0 rehearsals are bound to their commits and local artifact hashes, not CI-built binaries:

Gate Result Record
Published v0.14.2 x64, authenticated launcher and protected verifier 32 distinct gates PASS; network 10/10; four proof sets 12/12 record
v0.14.0 product code, full x64 campaign with the rebuilt harness (local unsigned candidates) 32 gates PASS, gate 36 10/10, post-run checks 11/11; host-startup provenance unverified (RB-01) record
Published v0.12.0 downloads, supply chain, x64 install/MCP/EN-FR-ES smoke and cleanup PASS record
Historical v0.12.0 x64 installer, ETW, WFP/SCM, trust, local/Network IPC and cleanup PASS record
WFP enforcement, SCM, rollback, per-app scoping 25 checks, 0 failures record
Service-path trust, adversarial TOCTOU 11 checks, 0 failures record
Multi-user IPC capability boundary 7 checks, 0 failures record
Historical v0.11.6 x64 ETW, WFP/SCM, trust, local/Network IPC, installer and cleanup 19/19 ETW, 35/35 WFP, 13/13 trust, 7/7 local IPC, 7/7 Network Logon, 3/3 observer record
Exact dashboard settings layout, posture interpretation, installer and EN/FR/ES smoke PASS record

Each record covers its named checks on its exact binaries. The 2026-09-26 record exercises the code corrected by the September audit, as local unsigned candidates subject to RB-01; the older records predate it. The 2026-08-23 campaign closed the former IPC-path, Network Logon and host-control gaps; the 2026-08-25 record qualifies only the changed dashboard/package surface and does not pretend to rerun those privileged gates. Native Arm64 privileged gates, x64-on-Arm64 identity and independent EN/FR/ES review remain open; the latter is recommended rather than a technical publication gate. Unsigned distribution is an accepted visible limitation, not a claim that signing has passed.

The authoritative statement, with every limitation named: docs/PRODUCTION_READINESS.md.

Documentation

For Document
An overview, in English, French or Spanish winsight.edeveloppe.com
Installing and deploying INSTALLATION.md, ADMINISTRATION.md
Something is wrong now RECOVERY.md
What it detects DETECTIONS.md
Security SECURITY.md, THREAT_MODEL.md
Privacy and code signing PRIVACY.md, CODE_SIGNING.md
How it is built ARCHITECTURE.md, WFP_DESIGN.md
Contributing code CODING_STANDARDS.md
Releasing and verifying RELEASE.md
Evidence validation/
Security and architecture audit (September 2026, in French) AUDIT.md
Where it is going ROADMAP.md, OBJECTIVE_SEE_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md

Build from source

Requires the .NET 10 SDK on Windows. global.json pins the supported SDK feature band.

dotnet restore winsight.sln
dotnet build winsight.sln -c Release
dotnet test winsight.sln -c Release --no-build
dotnet run --project src/WinSight.Dashboard

To reproduce the full release payload, including SBOM, installer and signing stage:

[xml]$props = Get-Content Directory.Build.props
./scripts/Build-Release.ps1 `
  -Version $props.Project.PropertyGroup.Version `
  -Architectures x64 `
  -DisableSignature

The build script restores the pinned Microsoft SBOM tool and installs the pinned Inno Setup compiler after verifying both its official SHA-256 and its Authenticode signature. Native Arm64 build, tests and packaging run on the windows-11-vs2026-arm CI runner; an x64 workstation does not substitute a cross-published binary for that native evidence.

Contributing

Issues and pull requests are welcome. The rules this codebase actually enforces are in CODING_STANDARDS.md, and most of them are checked by CI rather than by review: formatting, a dependency vulnerability audit, the full test suite on three Windows images including native Arm64, an 80% line-coverage floor on every detection-engine library and on the hand-written half of the privileged service, and a packaged install/uninstall lifecycle on native x64 and native Arm64.

Security issues go through private reporting, not public issues.

License

GPL-3.0-or-later. Objective-See's tools are open; copyleft keeps a security tool auditable by the people who depend on it.

About

Free, open-source, transparent security suite for Windows, in the spirit of Objective-See: persistence scanner + real-time persistence alerts (Guardian), per-app outbound firewall (WFP), camera/mic & connection visibility, catalog-aware Authenticode. Local-only, no telemetry.

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