Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. Please do not open a public issue, discussion or pull request for a security problem.
Say which version or commit you tested, how to reproduce it, and what you think it leads to. You will get a first answer within a week. A confirmed problem is fixed in a new release, and the advisory credits you unless you would rather it did not.
The project is in early development and has no release yet. Until the first
one, only the newest commit on dev is fixed.
The game is about breaking into fictional computers, so please be clear about which kind of problem you are reporting.
In scope — anything that breaks the real software:
- Reaching another player's account, session or run.
- Making the server do something as another player, or without a session.
- Reading or changing data the server should not have let you touch.
- Getting out of the container, running a command on the host, or reaching the database directly.
- Breaking the sign-up protections well enough to make accounts in bulk.
- Anything that leaks a password, a session token, a recovery code or an invite code.
Not a vulnerability — winning at the game:
- Doing well inside the rules, or finding an advantage the rules allow. That is an issue about balance, and a normal issue is the place for it.
- Reading the world's data files. They ship with the server and are public.
- Automating play on your own instance.
These are the controls the code keeps, so you know what to test against.
- The server decides everything. The browser shows state and sends commands. Nothing a player's page claims about the state is believed.
- Passwords are hashed with argon2id. A sign-in for a name that does not exist spends the same time as a wrong password, so the answer does not say which accounts exist.
- Sessions live in a table on the server, named by a cookie the page
cannot read. The cookie is HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, and over HTTPS it carries
the
__Host-prefix. A session ends after two weeks unused, and after sixty days whatever happens. Recovering an account ends every other session. - Recovery and invite codes are stored as HMACs keyed with a secret that only the server holds. A copy of the database does not reveal a code.
- Sign-ups are behind a proof-of-work the browser computes, limits per network, and a trap field. No third-party service is involved.
- Sign-ins slow down after repeated failures rather than locking an account, so nobody can lock another player out.
- Addresses are used only for short-lived rate limits, in memory, and are
never written down.
X-Forwarded-Foris believed only from a proxy the operator named. - The page fetches nothing from another site; the content security policy allows only its own origin.
- The image holds one static binary, the world's data and the built page: no shell, no package manager, not root, and a read-only filesystem. CI checks all of this on every change.
- Put it behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS, and leave
DARKNODE_COOKIE_SECUREattrue. - Keep
secrets/to yourself: the directory is what protects the files on the host. Back upserver_secretwith the database, because every recovery and invite code is tied to it. - Name your proxy in
DARKNODE_TRUSTED_PROXIES, and nothing else. Trusting a network you do not control lets a visitor claim any address they like. - The database publishes no port of its own in the supplied compose file. Leave it that way.